Learning from the Mistakes of Others

From Ted Metcalfe – a longish read but well worthwhile and thoughtful as always …

We’re not good at sharing stories in the Australian pipeline industry, and in my opinion that is a weakness we should address.

I recently drafted the short article which is now available on AS2885.info, setting out some examples of how awareness of unplanned outcomes has already influenced the continuing improvement of the AS2885 suite of Standards.

My objective with this post is to initiate a conversation in order to identify what level of interest there may be in sharing stories, and maybe even development of an online repository of information about unplanned outcomes in the world-wide pipeline industry with particular focus on lessons learned relevant to Australian pipelines.

Why Share Stories?

The value of articulating lessons learned for the benefit of others has been well-known for many years.  

In his 1998 book “What Went Wrong? Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters” it was Trevor Kletz, (the man who invented the HAZOP process), who set out five very good justifications for sharing stories, paraphrased here as:

  • Moral – If we have information that might prevent an accident, then we have a duty to pass that information on to others who face similar circumstances.
  • Pragmatic – If we tell others what we have learned, they may return the favour by similarly informing us about what they have learned.
  • Economic – In a competitive world, if we tell others about things we have done to prevent further accidents, they may spend as much as we have to protect themselves.
  • Industry Perspective – If one company has a serious accident, the entire industry suffers loss of public esteem, and any new legislation arising will affect the whole industry, driving up costs.
  • Impact – Nothing reads and sticks like an accident report.  Mere cautionary guidance is easily forgotten, but we will remember reading about the consequences of getting it wrong.

Sharing stories is just another form of communication and collaboration, which James Trevelyan emphasises as important for the engineering profession in his book The Making of an Expert Engineer.

For me personally, my interest in sharing stories derives from reading a book many years ago called “Set Phasers on Stun” by Stephen Casey.  It’s a collection of short accounts of many different disasters, all caused in some way by human error or by failures in design of the man-machine interface.  There have been many more similar disasters since the book was written in 1998, so I hope he does an update.

Since then, I have read extensively about failures of complex engineered systems. The human error component contributing to those failures has prompted even more reading about how people think and make decisions.  I have reviewed over fifty failure events overseas and in Australia in pursuing this hobby.  

Yes, I admit to being hooked on “disaster porn”, but I believe that with increased awareness of things that have gone badly wrong, I have learned a lot about what works and what doesn’t work in design and operation of complex engineered systems.

Why are we reluctant to share stories?

We are all aware of stories which probably ought to be shared with others.

How do I identify what stories ought to be told?  When I hear about something that went wrong, I just put myself in the position of those directly involved and ask the question: 

If I were in their shoes, would I do things that way again?” 

If the answers that come to mind are “probably not” or “hell no!”; then the story should be shared so that the lessons get passed on to others.

Until recently in the pipeline industry there has not been widespread support for story-telling as a means of passing on knowledge, but the EPCRC researchers documented some research around story-telling as a learning tool indicating positive benefits from doing so.  

Our Pipeline Operators Group maintains a reasonably complete database of incidents of damage to pipelines in the Australian pipeline industry, and from conversation with those administering that database it is clear that some operators are reluctant to admit “own goals”.  

Similarly, poor outcomes or failures in project execution are embarrassments, too often hidden, and so the lessons are not learned by others.

In previous conversations about this concept, others have often expressed concern about getting the facts exactly correct, and a reluctance to identify the parties involved.  I take the view that it is not necessary to do either in order to pass on the important lessons in an effective manner.

Another concern often expressed by others has been fear of potential legal repercussions.  That’s probably a valid concern.  

Readers are invited to respond to this post with comments, feedback, and maybe a story or two; but given that there is some sensitivity around sharing stories, we need some guidelines.

Some guidelines for posting about this topic

If you are sharing a story about Australian events with unplanned outcomes

  • Provide enough description about what happened to put the event in proper context.
  • Focus on extracting the lessons learned which can help others avoid similar unplanned outcomes.
  • Don’t upset anyone by publicly sharing confidential information.
  • If the story can’t be written in an anonymous way so that the identity of the companies or personnel involved is protected, then it probably should not be posted.

The stories can be anything that generates a lesson that pipeliners ought to be aware of. The reasons for unplanned poor outcomes might include any of the following:

  • Inadequate competence and experience.
  • Inadequate or overly-optimistic planning (both budget and schedule).
  • Failure to adequately implement Front End Loading (FEL) practices.
  • Over-specification or under-specification in procurement of contracts and services.
  • Inadequate consideration of potential outcomes, leading to unexpected consequences.
  • Contracting and commercial pressures.
  • Poor selection and administration of contracting strategies.

I guess the above list says there’s lots of ways we might get things wrong!

Overseas disasters

There is certainly no shortage of examples of stories about unplanned outcomes in the world-wide pipeline industry.  

The USA experience is particularly frightening in this regard.  Just go to Wikipedia and search on “List of pipeline accidents in the United States”.  It goes on for many pages.

We have all heard about the big ones like San Bruno and more recently Boston, and for events like that there’s lots of links available to formal investigation reports of hundreds of pages each.  

Not many people are prepared to wade through hundreds of pages to identify the lessons.

For overseas disasters, what may be more useful for Australian engineers is a brief summary about what happened, why it happened, and how such an unplanned outcome can be prevented.   

If there is genuine interest among readers, some of us might be willing to prepare such summaries for others in Australia to read.

Would you like to see a collation of information on each such disaster which summarises what happened and why, and how the lessons learned are relevant for Australian pipelines?

Let us know by posting a response on the blog.

Australia has stories too

We may not have had any similar “disasters” in Australia (yet), but there have been some unplanned outcomes and sub-optimal projects in our pipeline industry, and not all were directly related to pipeline engineering design.  

Although it can be argued that project management and contractual matters are not issues of technical competence, it is my opinion that a solid understanding of such matters by pipeline engineers is important, and also that project management decisions ought to fully recognise technical advice prepared by engineers.  

Valuable engineering lessons can be learned from study of process plant failures as well.

The triggers for unplanned poor outcomes that I have personally witnessed over many years in Australia include:

  • Quality and System Integrity failures.
  • Contractual disputes arising from reliance upon lawyers instead of on engineering competence.
  • Aggressive cost-cutting.
  • Pushing the envelope with new technology or untried procedures.
  • Coatings and coating defects generally, and the technical and commercial aspects of long-term Field Joint Coating integrity in particular.
  • Circumstances peculiar to the recent CSG-to-LNG Boom in Queensland.
  • Acceptance of residual risk when further mitigation ought to have been applied.
  • Inadequate understanding of the technical challenges during design and planning of Horizontal Directional Drills.   

I guess this list says there’s a lot of ways we have indeed got things wrong.

Benefits to our industry

Every unplanned outcome hurts our industry in terms of supply reliability or cost or reputation or all of these.

Stories usually have a significant engineering knowledge component which affects asset integrity, and sharing such stories for increased awareness can only improve the safety and reliability of our industry.

In my opinion, if only a fraction of the legal expenses incurred in dealing with unplanned outcomes of the past had been spent instead to assist development of better skills and competence in pipeline engineering, we would be a much-improved industry today.

Over to You

Feedback, comments and maybe a story or two to share with other blog readers are welcome.

If you are keen to read some good disaster porn or better understand how people think and make decisions, I have a long list of recommended reading for you.

Conformance webinar – a late report

After the webinar on 4 August this blog reported on it very briefly here, and then Ted Metcalfe wrote the following comprehensive report that was inexcusably mislaid for a while. But better late than never …

In difficult times, we need a safe means of holding important industry conversations, and technical webinars have emerged as one way to remain connected with others in our industry and continue sharing knowledge.  A very good example was the webinar titled “Demonstration of Conformance” held 4 August, hosted by APGA and the AS2885.INFO team for discussion about conforming (or complying) with AS2885.

The webinar was recorded and is well worth watching for those who regularly use the AS2885 suite of Standards.

Selection of this particular webinar topic all started with a simple question made up well over a year ago just to test the correspondence features of the AS2885.INFO website system:

Can you advise on any recommended document formats for demonstration of compliance with AS2885?

Discussion within the AS2885.INFO team before the webinar prompted several more questions:

What does it mean to say that the work completed is in conformance with the Standard? 

How and why can demonstration of conformance be achieved?

How can we be confident that pipeline engineers have indeed understood the intent of the Standard and that the requirements of the Standard had been met?

Who has the qualifications to determine whether or not conformance has been demonstrated, and how do we know they are competent to do so?

The two-hour webinar was introduced by Karen Polglaze of APGA and then facilitated by Susan Jacques of the AS2885.INFO team.  As intended, it was much more of an interactive workshop than a simple technical presentation, and audience participation was strongly encouraged.

On screen was a Panel comprising members of the AS2885.INFO team and several others who had been approached to participate and contribute to the discussions.  The make-up of the Panel comprised representatives of owner/operator companies, the SA technical Regulator, and several experienced independent consultants.

After introductions, Peter Tuft presented some introductory slides which described the various approaches which have been used in the past and highlighted some of the complexities and issues associated with the concept of conformance.

The team clarified that:

  • While conformance demonstration is most often a Part 1 matter, the webinar scope intentionally included all Parts of AS2885, and that
  • The webinar was not intended to result in written recommendation guidelines but simply to increase awareness.

Each of the Panel members expressed their views on the matter based on many years of experience in the industry, and then the Panel remained on screen to field questions during discussion which followed.  The panel was well balanced, and all of their presentations were valid perspectives for consideration. 

Panel members were largely in agreement on most issues. It all went very well, and the entire two hours was filled with spirited discussion.  At least 75 of the original 100 attendees were still online near the end, so attention remained high.  Some challenges from the floor were welcomed and indicated that attendees were listening carefully.  

It was interesting that the concept of competence came up many times in discussion of getting demonstration of conformance right, prompting a further question:  

Who decides whether or not certain requirements of the Standard are both relevant and applicable?

Maybe the Pipeline Engineer Competency System needs a new competency defined here!

Discussion of the Technical Authority concept provided an opportunity to introduce the recently completed Engineering Practice Guide.  Discussion included the vexing issue of balancing cost and schedule imperatives with engineering outcomes.

Maybe the concept of conformance could be included in the next revision of the Engineering Practice Guide.

A recording of the webinar is available here.

If you would like to make further comment after watching the recording, contact the AS2885.INFO team via email at info@as2885.info or leave a reply below.

What is external interference?

There has been discussion in some of the AS 2885 committees about exactly what “external interference” includes. It is probably fair to say that the meaning of “external interference” seemed so clear and obvious to those involved in drafting the various revisions of Parts 1 and 6, over many years, that it never occurred to us that an explicit definition would be needed. That now looks like an oversight as some misunderstanding has developed.

The nearest thing we have to a definition is unfortunately buried in Clause C6.1 of Appendix C to Part 6:

The nature of external interference involves the removal or penetration of the protective ground cover and contact with the pipe.

Even that is not quite complete because it leaves unstated that external interference is a result of human activity and does not include natural events. So external interference is intended to cover only those threats that involve direct impact to the pipe during excavation (including digging, boring or any other ground-penetrating activity).

This is not new, and in fact has been a fundamental aspect of the safety management process ever since the concept of risk assessment was introduced in the 1997 revision of Part 1 (i.e. 24 years ago!). The whole SMS process is based on two broad categories of threat:

  • External interference
  • Everything else (corrosion, natural events, design or construction shortcomings, operational shortcomings, etc)

There are two reasons for this distinction:

  • Damage by direct impact to the pipe during excavation has long been known to be the overwhelmingly dominant cause of pipeline incidents and failures
  • Very specific design and operational measures can be specified by AS 2885 to mitigate such threats

From Part 1 Clause 5.4.1:

The purpose of physical controls is to prevent failure resulting from an identified external interference event by either physically preventing contact with the pipe or by providing adequate resistance to penetration in the pipe itself.

The purpose of procedural controls is to minimise the likelihood of external interference activity, with potential to damage a pipeline, occurring without the knowledge of the pipeline operator, and to maximise the likelihood of people undertaking such activity being aware of of both the presence of the pipeline and the possible consequences of damaging it.

Clause 5.4.4 and Tables 5.4.4(A) and (B) then go on to specify that physical protection measures must include both separation and resistance to penetration (with multiple subcategories), and that procedural protection must include both pipeline awareness and external interference detection (again with multiple subcategories)

All these requirements (and the further much more detailed requirements) are focussed specifically on protection against excavation activities, and make little or no sense for other types of threat.

So it is simply not correct to classify as “external interference” threats such as:

  • external loads due to vehicles (no contact with pipe or possibility of penetration)
  • ground movement (not human-caused, no possibility of penetration although severe deformation may cause rupture)
  • exposure of the pipe due to erosion (ditto)
  • anything else to which the principles of physical and procedure protection against human-caused impact and penetration don’t make sense

Above-ground pipes may look like a grey area, since removal of ground cover is obviously not applicable. However the other principles of protection by separation and penetration resistance are still relevant, as are procedural measures. So the external interference rules are still relevant to threats such as vehicle impact on aboveground pipe.

Everyone involved in pipeline safety management studies should be aware of what constitutes external interference, whether the SMS is for design or operational purposes.

Barred tee fabrication

We’ve been quiet lately, for a whole lot of reasons largely related to being a volunteer team. But there has been a recent update to AS2885.info with guidance on how to fabricate a barred tee without welding in the area of the extrusion neck. It’s the second item on this page and also copied below.

It is interesting that this method was normal practice at least 40 years ago, but sometimes old knowledge can be lost if it is not documented somewhere such as in a Standard as has now been done.

Barred tees: What is the reason behind the addition of Clause 5.6.2(e) in AS 2885.2-2016 (Clause 5.6.2(d) in 2020 version), which states that “pig bars shall not be welded directly to the high stress areas around the extrusion neck”?

On any forged fitting it is recommended to only weld at the weld preparation area, as stresses caused by welding can cause cracking at subsurface features such as laminations. This is often not detected using Magnetic Particle Inspection unless it is surface breaking. The passage of the pig could then cause failure of the bars and a stuck pig scenario.

The diagram below is a guide (not definitive) showing how the pig bars are welded to the pup piece rather than the extruded neck.

Webinars – Demonstration of Conformance and others

The webinar on 4 August, 2021 (mentioned in an earlier post) was a very successful and popular session with a panel of presenters giving multiple perspectives on how conformance with AS 2885 can be demonstrated in a range of contexts. For those unable to join in, or who want to revisit any aspect, it was recorded and is now available for viewing here.

In fact there is a bunch of previous AS 2885 webinars here. Most run for about an hour but this latest one is about 2 hours because of the number of panellists.

Fracture toughness for components

Fracture control can be complicated enough without the additional subtleties of things other than mainline pipe. It is not surprising that questions arise in this area.

AS2885.info has had a couple of recent additions dealing with Charpy testing for pipeline components – specifically hot tap fittings and flanged valves. These are quite specific issues but may also provide you with some guidance on how to handle other similar topics. And if there are other aspects that are not clear feel free to comment here or email info@as2885.info.

AS 2885 supporting documents

We have added to AS2885.info some links to potentially important background information, with the relevant page copied verbatim below. The documents were originally published over 10 years ago and became unavailable for a while but remain important.

This is not exactly bedtime reading. In fact parts of it can be quite dense and difficult to digest. But sometimes if you are grappling with the interpretation of AS 2885, or trying to understand why it says what it does, you might find this useful. In fact, you might as well download the two documents right now and file them somewhere handy.



In preparing each revision of AS 2885 the committees have often prepared Issue Papers that discuss a topic in detail and conclude with recommended changes to the Standard. These are working papers that tend to be abandoned when sufficient work has been done to reach a recommendation, even though the document may in some ways be incomplete or unpolished. For this reason most are not suitable for publication. However for the revision of Part 1 in 2007 nearly 80 Issue Papers were prepared and later edited for publication in 2010.

Since 2010 all Parts of AS 2885 have been revised, in some cases very substantially. However each revision of a Standard tends to build on the work of the previous revision. Hence much of the 2010 background documents remains valid as an explanation and justification for current content of Part 1 and to some extent Part 6 (which was split out from Part 1 in 2018). Users who refer to these documents must form their own judgement about the applicability to the current revision of the Standard. Note that the clause numbers referred to in the Issue Papers are for AS 2885.1-2007 and will be different for the 2018 Standards.

This Issue Paper publication project resulted in two large PDF documents:

  • “The APIA Guide to AS 2885”, August 2010
  • Appendix 2 to the Guide, “Issue Papers Prepared as Basis for AS 2885.1, Revision 2007”

APGA members can download them from the APGA Knowledgebase. Due to idiosyncrasies in the Knowledgebase metadata they are best found by searching for the date on which they were added to the Knowledgebase: 12/07/2021.

Some pages in this AS2885.info wiki refer to specific Issue Papers from the 2010 suite.


Over 60 Issue Papers were prepared prior to the 2018 revisions of Parts 1 and 6 but remain in their incomplete and unpolished state. The intellectual property of these papers lies with APGA. They may or may not be made publicly available in future. Requests for background information or copies of particular Issue Papers will be considered and may be granted depending on circumstances.

Demonstration of Conformance – webinar

APGA and some of the AS2885.info team have organised an online seminar about demonstration of conformance with AS 2885, 11:30 am – 1:30 pm Wednesday, 4 August, 2021.


Join us for a very special webinar event as APGA and members of the AS2885.info project team host an online workshop for presentations and discussion on matters relevant to conformance with the AS 2885 suite of Standards. The webinar will be a hybrid interactive format, and if you have been involved in demonstration of conformance with a story to tell, you are invited to join us as a panel member.

Pipeline design, construction, operation and maintenance must be done in a manner that conforms with the requirements of the AS 2885 Standard which is referenced in Australian legislation and regulation. But the way conformance should be determined and documented (and why) is not set out in any written guidelines. 

This webinar seeks to raise awareness of the various ways in which conformance can be demonstrated in the pipeline industry today. The webinar is not intended to provide definitive answers to conformance, but to discuss the various ways to do it.

The basic questions relevant to the discussion are:

·         When is assurance of conformance required?

·         Who should provide assurance of conformance, how, and why?

·         How can the client, licensee, or the regulator be confident that conformance has been achieved?

If you work with AS 2885 and have ever been asked to demonstrate conformance to the Standard, this workshop is for you. You can attend as a webinar guest (not visible to attendees), or as a Panel Member (visible on screen).

Panel members will include the AS2885.info team and invited industry members, with Susan Jaques acting as facilitator.